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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Were Mr. Larocco's rights against unreasonable search

and seizure violated where, without obtaining a warrant, the
officers opened the door of the vehicle in search of a vehicle
identification number (VIN) after viewing a VIN on the dashboard
which did not match that of the stolen vehicle?
2.

Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Larocco's

motion for a mistrial after a juror and a prosecution witness
conversed during a recess in the trial?
3.

Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Larocco's

motion for mistrial after two jurors apparently saw him shackled and
in police custody?
4.

Is possession of a stolen vehicle a lesser included

offense of theft of that same vehicle?

vii.

TEXT OF STATUES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution provides:
The
houses, papers
seizures shall
probable cause
describing the
seized.

right of the people to be secure in their persons,
and effects against unreasonable searches and
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be

Article I, Section 10, of the Utah Constitution provides:
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdictions, except in capital
cases, jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived
unless demanded.

viii.

TEXT CONTINUED
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) provides:
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(a) (1953 as amended) provides:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than
all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged.
Utah Code Ann. 41-1-112 (1953 as amended) provides:
Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle a felony. Any
person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle which
he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully
taken, receives, or transfers possession of the same from or to
another, or who has in his possession any vehicle which he knows or
has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who
is not an officer of the law engaged at the time in the performance
of his duty as such officer, is guilty of a felony.

ix.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26 (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant may take
an appeal from a final judgment of conviction, and pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended) whereby the Court has
discretion to grant a petition for writ of certiorari to review a
decision of the Court of Appeals.

On January 26, 1988, this Court

entered its order granting Mr. Larocco's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in all
issues raised herein.

See Addendum A.

x.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

PHILLIP P. LAROCCO,

:

Case No. 870412

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant, Phillip Paul Larocco, appeals from a
conviction and judgment for Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 and
§76-6-412 (1953 as amended) and Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953
as amended).

A jury convicted Mr. Larocco of both charges after a

trial held on December 9 and 10, 1985. On January 10, 1985,
Honorable David Dee, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, sentenced Mr. Larocpo to concurrent terms of
one to fifteen years and zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.
Mr. Larocco timely appealed his conviction to the Utah
Court of Appeals, raising four issues on appeal.

On August 27,

1987, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion, affirming the
convictions.

That decision is published at State v. Larocco, 742

P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987).

The Utah Court of Appeals denied

Mr. Larocco's Petition for Rehearing on October 6, 1987. On

January 26, 1988, this Court granted Mr. Larocco's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals on all issues raised
below.

See Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June, 1981, a man took a 1973 Ford Mustang for a test

drive from State Auto Sales Car Lot.

The man did not return the

car, nor did he pay for it (R. 186). The salesman, David Luce,
promptly reported the theft and gave a description of the thief to
police (R. 202). Mr. Luce described the thief as a white male, 5'8n
to 5'10* tall and weighing approximately 160-165 pounds; he also
told police that the thief resembled Dom DeLuise (R. 202). The
police did not arrest anyone on the charge at that time.
Four years later, in May, 1985, Mr. Luce saw a person he
believed to be the thief at a different car lot (R. 190). Mr. Luce
obtained information regarding the man he believed to be the thief
and relayed it to Mr. Padilla, the owner of State Auto Sales (R.
192) .
Mr. Padilla went to the neighborhood where the person Mr.
Luce had seen lived (R. 215). Mr. Padilla could not locate the
exact street address, but spotted a 1973 Ford Mustang within a
couple blocks of the address (R. 214-5).
of Mr. Larocco's home (R. 231, 237-8).

The Mustang was in front
Mr. Padilla did not see or

speak to Mr. Larocco or anyone else while viewing the Mustang.

Mr.

Padilla took down the license number, and contacted police (R. 215).
Two or three days later, Salt Lake County Detective Linda
Robison went to Mr. Larocco's house and saw a 1973 Ford Mustang
- 2
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parked in front, in the same place Mr. Padilla had reported seeing
it a few days earlier (R. 231). She noted the license number of the
car, its description, and the address, and

then left without

further approaching the vehicle or residence (R. 231-33).
Detective Robison ran a check on the plate and received a
vehicle identification number ("VIN") of 3F05H101968. A VIN search
revealed that a Mr. Neil Hailes of Salt Lake City had purchased the
car in 1973 and registered it through 1975; the next registration
entry for the VIN was to Mr. Larocco (R. 232-3).
About a week later, Detective Robison, Salt Lake County
Detective Owen and Kip Ingersoll from the Department of Motor
Vehicles went back to Mr. Larocco's home and observed the 1973 Ford
Mustang still parked there (R. 234). The trio looked through the
windshield and saw a VIN on the dash which was identical to the one
obtained by the detective when she ran a license check
(3F05H101968) . Mr. Ingersoll, the employee of the Department of
Motor Vehicles, inspected the visible VIN on the dashboard from the
exterior of the vehicle and determined that it appeared to be
affixed in the normal manner (R. 283). The visible VIN did not
match the VIN of the vehicle taken from Mr. Padilla's lot four years
earlier (R. 235-6).
After seeing the matching VIN on the dashboard, the
police opened the driver's door; the police did not have a warrant
when they entered the car in this manner (See Stipulation of Facts
in connection with Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on August 6,
1985).

After opening the car door, the police found a

- 3 -

different VIN, 3F05164088 on the safety standard sticker located on
the inside edge of the door (R. 235). The VIN on the safety
standard sticker matched that of the Mustang stolen from State Auto
Sales Car Lot four years earlier (R. 235). After finding the second
VIN, the police approached Mr. Laroccofs home and arrested him
(R. 15).
When the officers contacted Mr. Larocco on June 6, 1985,
he informed them that he had purchased the car from Streator
Chevrolet in 1981 (R. 239). Mr. Larocco's brother-in-law gave
police a Utah Certificate of Title showing a Ford Mustang with VIN
3F05H101968 belonging to Mr. Larocco (R. 240-1).
After impounding the vehicle, Mr. Ingersoll of the
Department of Motor Vehicles located on the car's frame a shorter
version of VIN similar to the VIN on the stolen Padilla vehicle
(R. 269-72).

Although the VIN on the dash appeared normal when

Mr. Ingersoll inspected it from the exterior, he also discovered
that the VIN on the dashboard had been glued on rather than riveted
(R. 270-1).

Subsequent investigation revealed that the VIN on the

dashboard matched a vehicle owned by Mr. Hailes which had been
totally destroyed in an accident in December, 1975 (R. 233, 251).
Prior to trial, Mr. Larocco filed a timely motion to
suppress evidence obtained by police as a result of the warrantless
search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle on June 6, 1985; the trial court
denied that motion (R. 60). Immediately before the trial started,
defense counsel renewed the motion to suppress and made a continuing

- 4
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objection to the use of the evidence seized (R. 169). At one of the
recesses immediately prior to the start of trial but after the
jurors had been sworn, one of the jurors had a fairly lengthly
conversation with witness Hailes, the man who had owned a 1973
Mustang with VIN matching that found on the dashboard of
Mr. Larocco's car (R. 164). The conversation dealt with general
topics as well as topics specific to the trial process (R. 164-7).
Another juror standing nearby apparently overheard the
conversation (R. 167). The trial court questioned the juror who had
been involved in the conversation, but did not question the juror
who apparently overheard the conversation to determine the impact of
the conversation (R. 167). Mr. Larocco moved for a mistrial based
on the conversation; the court denied the motion (R. 168-9).
Mr. Larocco requested that the trial court instruct the
jury that Possession of a Stolen Vehicle is a lesser included
offense of Theft of a Motor Vehicle (R. 324; See Addendum D). The
trial court denied the request and instructed the jury that it could
convict on both charges despite defense counsel's objection
(R. 324). The jury convicted Mr. Larocco of both counts (R. 325).
After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court
learned that two jurors had seen activity indicating that
Mr. Larocco was in custody during the trial.

Juror Bragg saw

Mr. Larocco, apparently handcuffed, being escorted down the stairs
by a man wearing a suit (R. 328). Juror Broadhead saw Mr. Larocco
being placed in a police car (R. 328-9).

- 5
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Both jurors told the trial

court that these observations had no influence on their
deliberations in the case (R. 329).
On January 10, 1986, Mr. Larocco made a timely motion to
arrest judgment based on the conversation between a juror and a
prosecution witness and also upon the observations of jurors which
led them to believe Mr. Larocco was in custody (R. 104-5).

The

trial court denied the motion (R. 345).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle violated
his rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the United
States Constitution.

Mr. Larocco had standing to raise the issue

and the officers actions constituted an impermissible search.
The warrantless search also violated Mr. Larocco's rights
under the Utah Constitution.

In the event this Court determines

that the warrantless search did not violate Mr. Larocco's federal
rights, it is nevertheless free to guarantee greater protections
under the Utah Constitution and continue to require that the
officers have both exigent circumstances and probable cause to
justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Larocco's motion for
mistrial after a juror and prosecution witness conversed during a
recess.

The contact was more than brief or incidental and the state

failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice raised by such contact.
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Larocco's motion for
mistrial after two jurors apparently saw him shackled and in police
custody.

Mr. Larocco's rights to a fair trial and equal protection
- 6
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of the laws were jeopardized when the jury received information that
he was incarcerated and in police custody at the time of trial.
The trial court erred in instructing the jury that Mr.
Larocco could be convicted of both possession of a stolen vehicle,
and theft of that same vehicle.

The possession charge is

encompassed by the theft and therefore it was error to enter
judgment against Mr. Larocco under both statutes. Furthermore,
Mr. Larocco was entitled to an instruction that possession of a
stolen vehicle was a lesser included offense of theft.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LAROCCOfS CAR
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH AND
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
A.

STANDING

A criminal defendant who does not assert a possessory or
property interest in a car, or automobile which is searched or in
evidence seized cannot raise a claim that his rights under the
fourth amendment to the federal constitution were violated.

See

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387
(1978).

This Court has held similarly that the protection from

unreasonable searches and seizures contained in Article I, §14 of
the Utah Constitution is personal in nature and can be asserted only
by one who has a right in the car, house or evidence seized.

State

v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah 1981).
In Rakas, the petitioners were passengers in a vehicle
which was searched by officers without a warrant.

The United States

Supreme Court established the inquiry for whether an individual has
- 7
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standing to raise a fourth amendment issue as "whether the person
who claims protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the invaded space,"

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.

In Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.
1965), the government charged the defendant with auto theft, and
claimed that he lacked standing to contest the search of the vehicle
after it was seized from him.

The Simpson court focused on the

weakness of such an argument:
[0]f all defendants prosecuted for automobile theft,
only those who actually owned the automobiles could
raise Fourth Amendment objections successfully.
Moreover, the proof of ownership would be sufficient
to quash the prosecution for theft of the
automobile. These constitutional rights belong to
the guilty as well as the innocent. (citation
omitted). The sole prerequisite to a defendant's
raising the Fourth Amendment issue is that he claims
a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched
or seized property.
Id. at 294.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the Simpson approach.
See e.g. United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977).
This Court has reviewed the issue of standing to
challenge the search of an allegedly stolen vehicle in a number of
cases.
In State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 1966), defendant
rented a car from a car rental agency under a false name and failed
to return it when due.

The defendant did not allege ownership in

the car and, because the officers established prior to the search
that the defendant did not own the car, the Court held that the
defendant did not have standing to raise the search issue.

- 8
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In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) and State
v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978), this Court held that a
defendant does not have standing to question the search of an
automobile where the defendant concedes that he does not own the
vehicle and cannot demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the automobile.

Montayne, Purcell, and Valdez are

distinguishable from the present case since Mr. Larocco claimed an
ownership interest in the vehicle and it whs not established prior
to the search that he did not have such an interest.
In State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987), the
officer stopped a car driven by the defendant because he knew the
defendant had a suspended drivers license.

The car was registered

to another person and defendant presented no evidence suggesting
that he had permission to drive the vehicle.

This Court found that

the defendant had no standing to challenge the legality of the
search, pointing out that "[a]bsent claimed right to possession, he
could not assert any expectation of privacy in the items
seized. . . ."

Id. at 127.

In all of the Utah cases where this Court found that the
defendant did not have standing to raise the search issue, officers
established prior to the search that the defendant did not own or
have a possessory interest in the property searched.

In contrast,

in the instant case, the police knew that the car was registered to
Mr. Larocco and parked in front of his house.
Requiring a defendant to establish his ownership of the
vehicle in order to have standing to challenge the automobile search

- 9
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would require a defendant charged with auto theft to prove the
ultimate issue in the case.

However, where a defendant had such

proof, there would be no need to challenge the search because the
theft charges would be quashed.
In the instant case, where Mr. Larocco claimed an
ownership interest in the vehicle and the information available to
officers prior to the search confirmed that ownership interest,
Mr. Larocco had standing to challenge the legality of the search
under either the Utah or United States Constitution.1

He should not

be required to prove the ultimate issue of the case in order to
assert his claim.
B.

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

The fourth amendment to the federal constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965), the
Court held that entrance into a car to find the VIN was a search
under the fourth amendment and the warrantless search of the vehicle
was unlawful.

In Simpson, officers seized the car parked outside

the defendant's hotel room after arresting the defendant for

1

In the event this Court determines that Mr. Larocco does not have
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim, it is nevertheless free
to decide that Mr. Larocco has standing to raise such a claim under
the Utah Constitution. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221
(Utah 1988) n.8; State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
- 10 -

vagrancy.

The Tenth Circuit suppressed the VIN as the fruit of an

unlawful search.
In United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970),
the Court reached the opposite conclusion, finding that entry into a
vehicle to ascertain the VIN does not constitute a search.

The

decision in Polk has drawn criticism from commentators and courts.
Professor LaFave stated:
Although this reasoning is not without some force,
the conclusion in Polk that entry of a vehicle to
find the VIN is no search and thus is not "within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment" is unsound. That
form of police surveillance, it is submitted, should
not go totally unregulated by constitutional
restraints, for that would mean that police could
enter any particular car on a whim and that they
could make wholesale entries of cars on nothing more
than a hope that one of them might turn out to be
stolen. Such surveillance intrudes upon a justified
expectation of privacy and thus, as Katz v. United
States teaches, is subject to Fourth Amendment
limitations.
LaFave, I Search and Seizure at 359-60.

See also United States v.

Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold J. dissenting).
In New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89
L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the
fourth amendment was not violated where an officer reached inside a
vehicle to move papers that were obscuring the VIN on the dashboard
after the driver had been stopped for a traffic violation, and had
exited the vehicle.

In the course of moving the papers on the

dashboard, the officer observed a gun protruding from underneath the
driver's seat.

The Court reasoned that since VINs are heavily

regulated and the VIN of cars built after 1969 must be on the
dashboard and readable from outside the vehicle, an individual does
- 11 -

not have an expectation of privacy in such a VIN and the officer
could move the papers to view that VIN.

The Court clearly stated,

however, that its holding
does not authorize police officers to enter a
vehicle to obtain a dashboard mounted VIN when the
VIN is visible from outside the automobile. If the
VIN is in the plain view of someone outside the
vehicle, there is no justification for governmental
intrusion into the passenger compartment to see it.
Id. at 94.
The Court further noted that the respondent sought to suppress the
gun, not the VIN, and the interior of a vehicle is subject to fourth
amendment protection and "the intrusion into that space constituted
a 'search1"

Id. at 115.

The present case is distinguishable from Class in that
Mr. Larocco was not stopped on a traffic violation nor was he in the
vehicle when the officers approached it.

Furthermore, the VIN was

mounted on the dashboard and clearly visible from outside the
vehicle as required by law and did not appear to have been tampered
with.

Under such circumstances, there was no basis for opening the

door of the vehicle or looking inside, and such an entry constituted
a search under the fourth amendment.
While the general rule is that police may not conduct a
search unless they obtain a warrant based on probable cause from a
neutral magistrate, the United States Supreme Court has carved a few
limited, specifically delineated exceptions to that rule.

See Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); New York v. Class, 475 U.S.
106, 116-17, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986).
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In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), this Court
outlined the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
exceptions are:

Those

(1) consent searches, (2) searches and seizures

made in hot pursuit, (3) searches and seizes of contraband in public
areas, (4) seizure of evidence in plain view after a lawful
intrusion, (5) searches and seizures of incident to lawful arrest
under exigent circumstances and (6), searches and seizures of
automobiles under exigent circumstances.

Id. at 179.

In the instant case, the only exception which is arguably
applicable is the "automobile exception".

The automobile exception

was first enunciated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).

In Carroll, police officers stopped a car and subsequently

searched it based on probable cause to believe liquor was inside the
vehicle.

After the officers found and seized liquor from the

vehicle, the Appellant challenged the warrantless search.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the search,
reasoning that some warrantless searches of automobiles are
permissible even though such a search of a building would not be
since automobiles can be easily moved, thereby causing the evidence
to be lost.

The Carroll Court allowed a limited exception to the

warrant requirement where officers had probable cause and the
exigencies of the situation made it impossible or highly impractical
to obtain a warrant.

Where officers stop k moving vehicle, the

occupants are put on notice that officers have knowledge of their
wrongdoing, and, because of the mobility of the vehicle, there is a
high probability that the evidence would be lost or destroyed if

- 13 -

officers were to get a warrant

before searching it.

Hence, for a

search to be permissible under the "automobile exception" both
exigent circumstances and probable cause must be present.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the
United States Supreme Court found the "automobile exception"
inapplicable and suppressed the evidence obtained from the
warrantless search.

In Coolidge, police suspected that the

defendant may have been involved in a murder.

After performing an

investigation, officers arrested the defendant in his house and
seized his automobile, which was parked in his driveway.

The Court

held that because officers knew of the presence of the automobile
and planned to seize it, no exigent circumstances existed to justify
police failure to obtain a valid warrant.

The Court pointed out

that "the determining factors [were] advance police knowledge of the
existence and location of the evidence, police intention to seize
it, and the ample opportunity for obtaining a warrant.

Coolidge,

403 U.S. at 478, 482.
The Coolidge Court reaffirmed the two prong test for the
"automobile exception" set forth in Carroll—that officers must have
probable cause and exigent circumstances must exist to justify a
warrantless search under the "automobile exception."
461-62.

Id. at

The Court emphasized that without such requirements, ". . .

it is but a short step to the position that it is never necessary
for the police to obtain a warrant before searching and seizing an
automobile" and "we would simply have to read the Fourth Amendment
out of the Constitution".

Id. at 479-80.
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Therefore, automobiles

are protected from warrantless search and seizure, unless officers
have probable cause and exigencies require the immediate search and
seizure.
In Hudson v. Texas, 588 S.W. 348 (Tex. 1979), the Court
held that the exigency required for a valid warrantless search of an
automobile is either (1) the car was moving when stopped, or (2) if
parked and unoccupied, the car was movable, the owner was alerted
that officers were investigating and the car would have been moved
if police did not immediately seize it.

The Court distinguished

between "moving" and "movable" vehicles and pointed out that while
in some circumstances, the same exigency may exist with an
unoccupied vehicle as with a moving one, that is not always the
case.

Hudson clarifies the exigencies announced by the United

States Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974),
under which a parked movable car can be seized and searched without
a warrant.
In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066,
85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the United States Supreme Court applied the
"automobile exception" to the warrantless search of a motor home
parked in a parking lot.

In Carney, officers who had uncorroborated

information that an individual was dispensing drugs in exchange for
sex from his motor home, questioned a young man who was leaving the
motor home.

The youth informed the officers that he had received

marijuana in return for sexual favors inside the motor home.

At the

officers' request, the youth knocked on the door of the motor home.
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In response, Carney stepped outside and officers arrested him.
Thereafter, officers searched the inside of the motor home without a
warrant.
In Carney, the Court stated:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if
it is readily capable of such use and is found
stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential purposes—temporary or otherwise—the
two justifications for the vehicle exception come
into play. First the vehicle is obviously readily
mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not
actually moving. Second, there is a reduced
expectation of a privacy stemming from its use as a
licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police
regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling.
Id. at 392-3 (footnote omitted).

Exigent circumstances existed in

Carney since the vehicle was parked in a public parking lot and
could be easily moved.
In the instant case, exigencies justifying a warrantless
search did not exist.

The automobile was parked in front of

Mr. Larocco's home and had been parked in that same location for
several days.

There is no evidence that Mr. Larocco knew the

officers were investigating him, nor was there any other evidence
that suggested that the officers needed to immediately search the
vehicle.

The leisurely pace of the investigation and the repeated

visits to the vehicle demonstrate that the officers would have had
ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.2

The present

2 To obtain a search warrant, the officers would have had to
establish to a neutral magistrate that they had probable cause.
However, as discussed infra, probable cause did not exist in this
case.
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case is similar to Coolidge in that police had conducted an
investigation prior to the search and seizure of the automobile and
seized the vehicle when it was parked and unoccupied.
When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged, it is
the statefs burden to demonstrate the exigent circumstances
justifying it. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).

As

was the case in Coolidge, no exigent circumstances justifying a
warrantless arrest existed in this case and the "automobile
exception" is therefore inapplicable.
Furthermore, officers lacked probable cause to search and
seize the automobile.

in addition to exigent circumstances,

officers must have probable cause to search in order to permissibly
search a vehicle without a warrant under the automobile exception.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
In State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986), this
Court quoted Brinegar v. United States, 33$ U.S. 160, 175-6, 69
S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 7879 (1949):
Probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that" an offense has been or is being committed.
This Court further stated:
The determination of whether probable cause exists,
therefore, depends upon an examination of all the
information available to the searching officer in
light of the circumstances as they existed at the
time the search was made (citations omitted).
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088.
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In the present case, police did not have probable cause
to justify the search of the Appellant's car.

After finding the car

parked in front of the Mr. Larocco's home, the police approached the
vehicle and looked through the windshield to see the VIN on the
dashboard.

This action was legal because it did not require

entrance into the automobile, as the dash mounted VIN can be seen
from the street.

The VIN on the dash was registered to Mr. Larocco

and did not match the VIN of the vehicle stolen from the car lot.
Furthermore, the VIN on the dash appeared to be correctly mounted
and did not seem to be tampered with (R. 283).
At that point police should have either continued their
investigation or attempted to obtain Mr. Larocco's consent to enter
the car.

The fact that the car's VIN did not match that of the

stolen car left the police officers without probable cause to search
the car.

The police actions in entering the car at that point were

based on no more than a hunch.

The United States Supreme Court has

held on a number of occasions that hunches will not suffice where
probable cause is lacking.

See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.

85 (1979).
In the present case, where the officers' entry into the
interior of the vehicle constituted a search, and there were no
exigent circumstances or probable cause to justify such a
warrantless search, the search violated the fourth amendment and the
evidence seized should have been suppressed.

Mr. Larocco

respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed, and the
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matter remanded to the district court for a new trial without the
illegally seized evidence.

C.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution contains
language almost identical to that of the fourth amendment to the
federal constitution.

In the event this Court determines that New

York v. Class or California v. Carney preclude fourth amendment
protection in the present case, this Court nevertheless has the
ability to interpret Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
differently from the Fourth Amendment and extend the protections of
that section to the facts of this case.

See State v. Watts, 750

P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) n.8; State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452
(Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,
271-2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).

It is well

established that in interpreting their own constitutions, states are
not limited by the interpretation given comparable federal
constitutional provisions.

See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 95

S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).
As previously outlined in point (b), supra, at 13-16, the
United States Supreme Court initially allowed an automobile
exception to the warrant requirement only where exigent
circumstances justified the suspension of the warrant requirement
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and officers had probable cause to believe the automobile contained
contraband or evidence relating to a crime.

In Carroll v. United

States, 278 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court held that a warrantless
search of an automobile does not violate the fourth amendment where
the officers have probable cause to search and the occupants are
alerted, the car can be moved and the contents of the vehicle may be
destroyed if the officers wait to search it until they have obtained
a warrant.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, exigent circumstances
justifying the suspension of the warrant requirement did not exist
and the Court refused to uphold the search, thereby reaffirming the
need for both exigent circumstances and probable cause in order to
dispense with the warrant requirement when searching an automobile.
Hence, historically, the automobile exception to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement has not been applicable unless the
officers had probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the
warrantless entry.
Utah case law has coincided with the historical
requirement under the fourth amendment that both exigent
circumstances and probable cause are required to search an
automobile without a warrant.

See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d

408 (Utah 1984); State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978); State
v. Cole, 674 P.2d

119 (Utah 1983).

Such cases have been decided

under both the State and federal constitutions.
The Oregon Supreme Court has taken the position that
"[w]hen this court gives Oregon law an interpretation corresponding

- 20 -

to a federal opinion, our decision remains the Oregon law even when
federal doctrine later changes"
(1982).

State v, Caraher, 653 P.2d 942

Under this approach, cases heretofore decided under

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution which require exigent
circumstances to justify the search of an automobile are still
controlling, and regardless of any change in the federal law, are
still applicable to the instant case.
In State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357 (Or. 1986), the Oregon
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Oregon Constitution
required officers to obtain a warrant to search the trunk of a
vehicle they had lawfully stopped where the officers had probable
cause to believe that the trunk contained evidence of a crime. The
Court held that an automobile exception to the warrant requirement
of the Oregon Constitution existed where (1) the automobile was
mobile at the time it was stopped by officers and (2) the officers
had probable cause to search the vehicle.

Id. at 1360. The Court

determined that the mobility of the automobile created an exigency,
but left open the question of whether a warrant is required where an
automobile is parked and unoccupied.

Jjd. at 1362-3.

In State v. Kock, 725 P.2d 1285 (Or. 1985), the Oregon
Supreme Court addressed the question it had left open in Brown, and
held that under the Oregon Constitution, "any search of an
automobile that was parked, immobile and unoccupied at the time the
police first encountered it . . . must be authorized by a warrant
issued by a magistrate or, alternatively, the prosecution must
demonstrate that exigent circumstances other than the potential
mobility of the automobile exist."

Id. at 1287.
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The Court pointed out that it would not extend the automobile
exception under the Oregon Constitution to the extent the United
States Supreme Court had extended it under the fourth amendment and
that "Brown sets the outer limit for warrantless automobile searches
without other exigent circumstances."

Id.

Pursuant to Utah case law, regardless of the direction
federal case law has taken, both probable cause and exigent
circumstances are required for the "automobile exception" to justify
a warrantless search of a vehicle.

In the instant case, as outlined

above, probable cause to search the vehicle did not exist since the
officers saw a VIN which did not match that of the stolen vehicle
from outside the Mustang.
In addition, no exigent circumstances justifying a
warrantless search existed.

The Mustang had been parked in front of

Mr. Larocco's house for several days, and a citizen witness as well
as an officer had inspected its exterior on at least two separate
occasions.

The officers had not contacted Mr. Larocco nor was there

any indication that Mr. Larocco was aware of the investigation.
Under such circumstances, exigencies justifying the
warrantless search did not exist, and officers violated Article I,
§14 of the Utah Constitution in searching the car without first
obtaining a warrant.

As a result, the trial court erred in failing

to suppress the VIN seized from the door jamb, and the conviction
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial without the
illegally seized evidence.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER A JUROR AND A
PROSECUTION WITNESS CONVERSED DURING A RECESS.
After the jury had been sworn but before any evidence had
been taken, a juror and a prosecution witness engaged in
conversation, while sharing an ashtray (R. 164-9).3

Mr. Larocco

made a timely motion for mistrial which the trial court denied
(R. 168-9).
Both the United States and the Utah Constitutions
guarantee a criminal defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature anc? cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
Similarly, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of
Utah provides for criminal trial by an impartial jury.
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), while citing
both the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Utah
Constitution, this Court pointed out that n[t]he rule in this
jurisdiction is that improper contact with witnesses or parties
raised a rebuttable presumption of prejudice"

(Id. at 280) and

3 The entire record of the trial court's questioning of Ms. Lembke
following this conversation is attached as Addendum B.
- 23 -

established that such a presumption attaches, regardless of the
content of the conversation, where the contact goes beyond the
barest, incidental contact.

This Court pointed out that a juror

might not recognize the impact of any contact with witnesses or
parties to the action, and that a defendant might be left with
questions as to the juror's impartiality after any such contact.
Id.

As a result, this Court placed the burden "on the prosecution

to prove that unauthorized contact did not influence the juror."

Id.

In Pike, the arresting officer who also witnessed a
portion of the incident conversed with jurors regarding an accident
he had at home which caused him to limp.

This Court found that the

conversation was more than a brief incidental contact and had the
effect "of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect
the juror's judgment as to credibility."

Id.

Although the jurors

denied that the contact would influence their deliberations, this
Court found that the denial was not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of prejudice, and remanded the case for a new trial.
This Court reached a similar decision in State v.
Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987).

In Erickson, one of the

prosecution witnesses engaged in a four to five minute conversation
with a juror.

The juror had previously disclosed during voir dire

that he and the witness had been neighbors approximately thirty
years before.

The juror and witness thereafter discussed their

families and jobs, but did not discuss the case.

This Court

reversed the case and remanded it for a new trial, pointing out that
in Pike it held that "the denial by a juror that he had not been
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influenced by the encounter was not enough to overcome the
presumption of prejudice."

Id. at 16.

In the instant case, the contact between Juror Lembke and
the prosecution witness was more egregious than the contact in
either Pike or Erickson, and was not brief or incidental.

After the

jury had been selected, and immediately prior to the start of the
trial, Juror Lembke and prosecution witness Hailes shared an
ashtray, apparently while each smoked at least one cigarette (R.
165, 168-9).

They discussed whether lights were working (R. 164)

and then moved on to topics of a more personal nature. Witness
Hailes informed the juror that he hoped the trial would not take
long since he was "going to Eureka, just driving down there, where I
lived".

(R. 164). He also asked the juror whether she had served

on a jury before (R. 167). This type of conversation breeds the
same sense of familiarity as the toe conversation in Pike and the
conversation regarding families and jobs in Erickson, and could
serve to align the juror with the State.
The conversation in this case went further than the
conversation in Pike or Erickson since Lembke's role as a juror and
her response to a voir dire question were discussed.

Although Juror

Lembke initially told the Court that she and Mr. Hailes had not
discussed the case during their conversation (R. 164), as
questioning continued, she acknowledged that a portion of the
conversation also dealt with question asked of the panel on voir
dire (R. 166). Witness Hailes indicated that he believed a police
officer's testimony should be given greater weight than that of a
lay witness and that he was surprised none of the jurors felt that
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way (R. 166-7).

Such a discussion as to the general veracity of

police officers was a clear message that their testimony should be
given greater weight.

Given the nature of the topics^ discussed,

the encounter between Hailes and the juror was more than brief or
incidental, giving rise to a rebuttal presumption of prejudice.
The State failed to rebut the presumption that Juror
Lembke was influenced by the conversation in this case.

As this

Court pointed out in Pike, two rationales for the rebuttable
presumption exist:

(1) a juror may not recognize the influence of a

conversation and it may be extremely difficult for a defendant to
prove such influence and (2) the judicial process suffers from the
appearance of impropriety resulting from a juror's conversation with
a witness.
In the present case, Hailes and the police officers were
important witnesses.

In order to convict Mr. Larocco, the jurors

would have to believe Hailes1 testimony that he had totalled his
Mustang in 1975, thereby establishing the availability of the VIN
from that car and the illicit use of such VIN by Mr. Larocco.
The testimony of the officers was also critical in
establishing the elements of the crimes charged.

To convict

4 Juror Lembke did not recall remarks regarding police veracity
until several pages into questioning. Initially, she informed the
Court that the substance of the conversation involved only Hailes
desire for quick resolution. This suggests that jurors not only
have difficulty recognizing whether they have been influenced by a
conversation but also in remembering and relaying details of the
conversation. It also raises a question as to whether all details
of the conversation in the instant case were raised.
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Mr. Larocco the jurors had to believe that the officers found two
different VINs, one of which was glued, rather than riveted, onto
the dashboard, and that the officer's conducted the investigation
fairly and efficiently.
In this case, both rationales for the rebuttable
presumption set forth in Pike are applicable.

Juror Lembke may well

have been affected by the conversation in regard to her perception
of Hailes' credibility as well as that of the police officers but
unable to recognize such influence.

Although she claimed that the

conversation would not affect her deliberations, such a claim is not
sufficient to rebut the presumption under Pike or Erickson.

In

addition, the appearance of impropriety in this case raises a
question as to whether Mr. Larocco received a fair trial.
Another juror stood nearby and apparently heard at least
a portion of the conversation (R. 167). Although the other juror
did not participate, overhearing the conversation amounts to more
than a brief incidental contact.

The trial judge failed to question

the other juror; having overheard a portion of the conversation, the
other juror could also have been influenced by the conversation.
The trial court's failure to question her and the State's failure to
otherwise rebut the presumption raises a question as to whether
Mr. Larocco received a fair trial.
In this case, where more than a brief or incidental
contact occurred between a prosecution witness and at least one
juror, and the state failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice
raised by such contact, the conviction should be reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR, LAROCCOfS
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER TWO JURORS APPARENTLY
SAW HIM SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY.
During the noon recess prior to the beginning of their
deliberations, two jurors saw Mr. Larocco in police custody.
Defense counsel raised the issue with the trial court immediately
after the jury delivered its verdict (R. 327) and the trial judge
thereafter questioned the jurors as to what they had seen
(R. 327-9).

(For transcript of entire questioning of jurors, See

Exhibit "C").
One of the jurors saw Mr. Larocco being escorted
downstairs by a man in a suit (R. 328). Although the Court did not
ask the juror whether Mr. Larocco was handcuffed, that apparently
was the case (R. 328). The other juror saw Mr. Larocco approaching
a police car; again, he was apparently handcuffed although the court
did not specifically question the juror regarding that detail
(R. 328-9).

Both jurors told the court that witnessing Mr. Larocco

in custody had no influence on their deliberations (R. 329).
Trying a defendant Ln identifiable prison clothing before
a jury violates the United States Constitution's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee to equal protection of the laws.

See Estelle v.

Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); see also Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341
(Utah 1980).

In Estelle v. Williams, the United States Supreme

Court pointed out that:
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The actual impact of a particular practice on the
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully
determined. But this Court has left no doubt that
the probability of deleterious effects on
fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 504-5 (citations omitted).

The Estelle Court also expressed

concern that persons in custody during trial were generally those
who cannot post bail.

Hence, persons who are in prison garb (or

otherwise in custody) are not given equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 505.
In Chess v. Smith, this Court acknowledged that the
prejudice of "appearing before a jury in identifiable prison clothes
is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create
a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial."
Chess, 617 P.2d at 344. This Court held that "[i]n a matter of such
fundamental importance to the basic fairness of a trial . . .

a

trial judge should on his own initiative inquire of a defendant
whether he wishes to waive his right not to appear in prison clothes
so that the record affirmatively shows an intelligent and conscious
waiver. . . ."

Id. at 345.

The California Supreme Court has consistently held that
the use of shackles or restraining devices on a defendant or defense
witness at trial is prejudicial and should not be permitted except
in extreme situations where a special need is demonstrated.

In

People v. Duran, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322 (Ca. 1976), the
California Supreme Court reasoned that jurors who see a defendant in
shackles are likely to believe that the defendant is violent and
therefore the use of such restraints should be limited to situations
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where "there is a showing of manifest need for such restraints."
Du_ran, 545 P.2d at 1327.
In the present casef two jurors saw the defendant
shackled and in custody after the trial had adjourned for the lunch
recess preceding the juryfs deliberations (R. 327). The fact that
the observations were made during an adjournment rather than during
trial proceedings does not distinguish this case from the previously
cited cases.

Although the State may have had a legitimate security

interest in having the defendant shackled and in custody as he was
leaving his trial, the trial court erred in allowing jurors to view
Mr. Larocco so restrained.5

The momentary viewing of Mr. Larocco in

custody established him as an incarcerated detainee in the minds of
the jurors.

The prejudice flowing from such momentary viewing is

precisely the same as the situation in which the defendant is
brought into court with prison garb or shackles on.

The two jurors'

perceptions of Mr. Larocco's were thereafter tainted by their
knowledge that Mr. Larocco's was being restrained and incarcerated
at the time of trial.

Mr. Larocco had a right to be brought before

the jurors, "with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a
free and innocent man, . . . " Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327.
A defendant who is able to post bail is able to present
the "appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent
man."

Because such a defendant has money, he goes through trial

5

The trial judge acknowledged, "I suppose what I am saying is the
bailiff should have made sure that situation didn't occur."
(R. 328.)
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unincarcerated and unfettered by shackles.

But the defendant who

cannot afford bail is subjected to shackles as well as police
custody.

For this reason, as the Supreme Court noted in Estelle v.

Williams, juror identification of the defendant as an inmate may
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of
the law as well as the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial.
The jurors' statements that they were not influenced by
viewing Mr. Larocco in custody fail to establish that the
information did not impact on their deliberations.

As this Court

has acknowledged in the context of contact between jurors and
witnesses, a juror may not be able to recognize the impact of
inadmissible information.

See discussion supra at 24; see also

State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985).

For all of the foregoing

reasons, Mr. Larocco's convictions should be reversed, and the case
remanded for a new trial.
POINT IV.
POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IS A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF THEFT OF THAT SAME VEHICLE.
Mr. Larocco raises two related assignments of error:
(1) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended), he
cannot be convicted of both possession of a stolen vehicle and theft
of that same vehicle since the theft encompasses the possession
offense, and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct that
possession of a stolen vehicle is a lesser included offense of theft
of that same vehicle.
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Prior to trial/ Mr. Larocco submitted a proposed jury
instruction which would have instructed jurors that possession of a
stolen vehicle is a lesser included offense of theft of an operable
vehicle (R. 94) (Addendum D).

The trial court refused to give the

instruction and instead instructed the jury that it could return
convictions for both offenses (R. 78) (Addendum E).

Defense counsel

objected to the court's instruction and the Court's refusal to give
the proposed lesser included offense instruction (R. 324).
A.

MR. LAROCCO CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF BOTH
THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AND POSSESSION OF
THAT SAME VEHICLE.

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended) provides in
pertinent part:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the
included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged;
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), this Court
held that theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery
under the circumstances of that case.

This court pointed out that a

principal and secondary test must be applied in determining whether
a greater-lesser relationship exists between two crimes.

The

principal test requires a comparison of the statutory elements of
each crime since an offense is a lesser included where "[i]t is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense charged. . . . "
Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(a) (1953 as amended).
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Utah

Because some crimes have multiple variations, the
"greater-lesser relationship exists between some variations of these
crimes, but not between others."

Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. As a

result, the secondary test is also required.

Pursuant to that test:

"[i]n order to determine whether a defendant can be
convicted and punished for two different crimes
committed in connection with a single criminal
episode, the court must consider the evidence to
determine whether the greater-lesser relationship
exists between the specific variations of the
crimes. . . . "
Id.

In Hill, the evidence showed that the only property taken was

taken from the manager as part of the robbery and therefore, theft
was a lesser included offense under both tests.
In State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985) (as Amended
on Rehearing), this court applied Hill and concluded that under the
circumstances of that case, aggravated assault was a lesser included
offense of the aggravated burglary.

Where a defendant is

inappropriately convicted of both a lesser included offense and a
greater offense, this Court has held that the appropriate remedy is
to reverse the lesser conviction and vacate the sentence.

Id. at

878-9.
In State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), this Court
concluded that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense
of aggravated robbery under the circumstances of that case since
different evidence was required to establish the two crimes and
different victims were involved in the two crimes.

Theft, however,

was a lesser included offense of the robbery under the circumstances
in Branch and this court reversed the theft conviction and vacated
the sentence.
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In Shackleford v. State, 481 P.2d 163 (Okl. 1971) the
court held that possession of narcotics taken in a robbery of a
pharmacy was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.
Numerous courts examining the issue of couble convictions have held
similarly to the Shackleford court that a defendant cannot be
convicted of theft (or robbery or larceny) and possession (or
receiving or retaining) the same stolen property.

See e.g.,

Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619 (Alaska App. 1981); Pierce v. State,
627 P.2d 211 (Alaska App. 1981); People v, Jackson, 627 P.2d 741
(Colo. 1981); State v. Alvarez, 678 P.2d 1132 (Kan. App. 1984);
State v, Hernandez, 689 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1984); State v. Smith,
679 P.2d 963 (N.M. App. 1983); State v. Richards, 621 P.2d 165
(Wash. App. 1980); People v. Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1976);
State v. Mcpherson, 444 P.2d 5 (Or. 1968).
In the present case, Mr. Larocco was convicted of theft
of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and of
possession of a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony.

Both

convictions related to the same vehicle, a 1973 Ford Mustang.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), lists the
elements of theft, the greater offense in this case:6
Theft — Elements. — A person commits theft if he
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.

6 in Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728,
5 L.Ed. 773 (1961), the United States Supreme Court pointed out
that the determination as to whether receiving stolen property
is a lesser included offense of theft of that property is a
question of statutory construction, and held that in that case,
receiving stolen property was a lesser included offense of
theft of the same property.
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Because the theft was of an operable motor vehicle, the offense is a
second degree felony.
amended).

U.C.A. §76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (1953 as

Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 proscribes possession of a

stolen vehicle:
Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle a
felony. Any person who . . .
has in his possession any vehicle which he knows or
has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully
taken, and who is not an officer of the law engaged
at the time in the performance of his duty as such
officer, is guilty of a felony.
By definition, theft contains two elements:

1)

obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over the property of
another, 2) with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
stolen vehicle also contains two elements:

1)

Possessing a

possessing a

vehicle, and 2) the possessor knowing or having reason to believe it
was stolen.

Both of the elements of possession of a stolen vehicle

are necessarily included in the first element of theft.

Hence, the

first prong of the Hill test is met.
The second prong of the Hill test requires a
determination as to whether "the greater-lesser relationship exists
between the specific variations of the crimes. . . . "
Hill, 674 P.2d at 97.

State v.

In the instant case, the theft of the vehicle

occurred four years prior to the arrest of Mr. Larocco.

There is no

evidence that during the four year gap, there were other persons who
possessed the vehicle or intervening circumstances in regard to the
possession of the vehicle.

Under such circumstances, the second

prong of the Hill test is met.

Possession of the stolen vehicle is

therefore a lesser included offense of theft of that same vehicle.
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Mr. Larocco's conviction for both offenses violates the fifth
amendment prohibition against double jeopardy and/or the prohibition
against double conviction contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)
(1953 as amended) .
Phillip Larocco respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the lesser conviction (possession of a stolen vehicle) and
vacate its sentence.

Additionally/ Mr. Larocco was entitled to an

instruction on possession of a stolen vehicle as a lesser offense of
the theft count (see Subpoint B, below), and the trial court's
refusal to so instruct the jury constituted reversible error,
mandating a remand of the theft conviction for retrial.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IS
A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF THAT
SAME VEHICLE.

In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), this Court
clarified that where a defendant requests an instruction regarding a
lesser included offense, the test to be applied is the broader
evidence-based standard.

Pursuant to this evidenced based standard,

two requirements must be met:
First, the statutory elements of the offenses must
be related in some way; there must be some overlap
in the definitions of the two crimes, even though
they need not meet the totally "included" standard.

Second, . . . the court must instruct on the lesser
offense only if there is some evidence at trial
that, if believed by the jury, would provide a
"rational basis for a verdict of acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him
of the included offense."
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State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah 1984) quoting Utah Code Ann.
§76-1-402(4) (1953 as amended).
In emphasizing the importance of instructions on lesser
included offenses, this Court quoted the United States Supreme Court:
[I]t has long been recognized that "the lesser
included offense' can also be beneficial to the
defendant because it affords the jury a less drastic
alternative than the choice between conviction of
the offense charged and acquittal.
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 167 quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 633 (1980).
The first step of the evidence-based analysis requires a
comparison of the elements of the two offenses to determine whether
there is an overlap between the elements of the two crimes.

In the

instant case, the possession of a stolen vehicle necessarily
involves the exercise of unauthorized control over the property of
another (See subpoint A, above) and therefore is a lesser included
offense of theft of that same vehicle.
The second step in the evidence-based analysis requires
consideration of whether some evidence was presented at trial which,
if believed by the jury, would provide a rational basis for
acquitting the defendant of the greater offense and convicting on
the lesser included offense.

In order to establish the theft

charge, the greater offense, the state was required to establish
that Mr. Larocco took the vehicle.

To establish the theft, the

State relied on the identification testimony of David Luce, the
salesman.

Although Mr. Luce identified Mr. Larocco as the person
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who test drove the car and never returned it, his description of the
thief did not match Mr. Larocco's physical appearance.
Mr. Luce described the person who took the car as 5'8" 5'10" in height and weighing 160-165 pounds (R. 202), which was
approximately Mr. Luce's size.

However, at trial, defense counsel

pointed out to the jury the obvious fact that Mr. Larocco is a tall,
heavy set man (R. 310). Although the record does not make clear
exactly how tall he is nor how much Mr. Larocco weighed, his sister,
Paula Bone, testified that the defendant wore a size extra-extralarge shirt and that it was very difficult to find pants large
enough for him (R. 291). Furthermore, both Ms. Bone and Darrel
Norman, Mr. Larocco's brother-in-law, testified that Mr. Larocco was
at least as heavy in 1981 (at the time the car was stolen), as he
was at trial (R. 290, 295).
The weak identification weighed against the theft charge,
but had no bearing on the possession of a stolen motor vehicle
charge.

Mr. Luce's testimony was the only evidence that Mr. Larocco

stole the vehicle.

Therefore, the inaccurate identification of

Mr. Larocco provided a rational basis for acquitting him of theft
but still convicting him of possession of a stolen vehicle.
Mr. Larocco does not bear the burden of showing that such an outcome
was likely; he need only demonstrate a rational basis for such
action, in keeping with this Court's recognition that lesser
included offense instructions should be liberally available to
defendants where a possibility exists that the jury might choose to
conviction a lesser offense.

The evidence in this case presented
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such a possibility, and the trial court committed reversible error
in failing to give the requested instruction.
CONCLUSION
Phillip Larocco, Appellant, respectfully requests that
this Court reverse his convictions and remand his case to the trial
court for either dismissal of the charges or a new trial.
Respectfully submitted, this

^1

day of June, 1988.

LISA J./REMAL
Attorney for Appellant
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JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOop

Regular October Term, 1987

January 26, 198$f

Phillip Paul Larocco,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 870412

State of Utah,
Respondent.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered
that a Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as prayed.

ADDENDUM B

1

other chances if you want to look at my chambers later on.

2

But we'll be in recess on this case until 2:00 p.m.

3

(Whereupon, court recessed

4

at 12:15 p.m. and reconvened at 2:12 p.m. in chambers with

5

Court and counsel present.)

6 I

THE COURT:

7

Hi, Mrs. Lembke.

Come on in.

The record should show that Mrs. Lembke, one

8

of the jurors in the case before the Court, is in chambers

9

with the lawyer for the defendant and the prosecutor

10

because there was an observed conversation between the

11 I juror and one of the persons out in the hall who is called
\2\SLsa

witness for the prosecution.

And there is a question

13

raised about the conversation, whether you talked with this

14

witness about the case.

15

JUROR LEMBKE:

16

THE COURT:

17
18

No.

What were you talking about,

if you don't mind us finding out about it?
JUROR LEMBKE:

Well, first of all, he

19

pulled the light switch in the hall and had mentioned that

20

it worked, and then he did the other switch.

21

he just was saying he hoped it didn't - - the case didn't

22

go long, that he was going to Eureka, just driving down

23

there, where I lived.

24

at all about the case.

25

And then

Just general conversation.

THE COURT:

Nothing

Did you know who he was?

o

JUROR LEMBKE:
his sweater.

I thought I recognized

We shared an ashtray.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, I don't think

that there's anything else about the conversation as far
It f s a question of friendliness or

as that's concerned.

whatever that sometimes raises a question about what you
would think of h i m as a witness or if he was called or
9 I not called, whatever.

We have to be very careful about

9 j that sort of thing.
10

JUROR LEMBKE:

u

THE COURT:

12

I understand.

I guess what we ought to do

is isolate everybody from everybody in terms of that

t3 | sort of thing.

Maybe the jurors should go down to the

14

other end of the hall, the City end, while people are

15

out in the hall.

16

know who they are.

17
18

Y o u don't know who they are, and I don't
And that would end speculation.

Do you feel comfortable about the whole thing?
Otherwise - -

19

JUROR LEMBKE:

20

THE COURT:

21

24
25

Okay.

As long as that was

the substance of your conversation.

22
23

Yes.

JUROR LEMBKE:

Yes.

The case wasn't

mentioned at all.
MR. H0RT0N:

Do you feel you can still

be fair to both sides and not be influenced by the

L

22

conversation out in the hall?
JUROR LEMBKE: Yes, because we didn't
talk about anything involving anything.
know why he's here.

I mean I don't

I don't, you know, other than the

fact he is a witness.

I have no idea.

MR. HORTON:

Do you feel you could

weigh his testimony the same as any other witnesses if
he testifies and he is subject to cross-examination and
so forth?
JUROR LEMBKE: Yes.
MS. REMAL:

Do you feel as though the

fact you had this conversation makes him more believable - JUROR LEMBKE: No.
MS. REMAL:

- - because you already

talked to him?
JUROR LEMBKE: No.
He did mention one thing.

That he was

surprised at the questions that were-asked.

And that

he was - - he was surprised, and that he, himself, would
have said, yes, when you asked if you would believe a
policeman more than any other person, that was the only
comment that was made. And - - and I didn't - - when the
judge asked if we would believe a policeman more than any
other person, and he said he probably would have raised
his hand.

29

THE COURT:

If he had been a juror?

JUROR LEMBKE:

Had he been a juror,

that would be his , you know - MS. REMAL:

So you did have that bit of

conversation concerning the jury selection?
JUROR LEMBKE: Yeah.

He did say that.

I made no comment •
MS. REMAL: Was there any other discussion
about the questions asked on jury selection or anything
like that?
JUROR LEMBKE:

No. And he asked me if

I had ever served on a jury before, and I said, "No.11
THE COURT: Any other jurors there while
all of this was going on?
JUROR LEMBKE:
next to me there.

One.

The girl sitting

As he was walking up to use the ashtray,

she left, and he used the ashtray.
THE COURT:

The young lady on your left?

JUROR LEMBKE:

On my right.

The blonde.

(Indicating.)
THE COURT: Okay.
JUROR LEMBKE:
walking by.

Or she left just as he was

The one right there. We were out there

before - THE COURT: Okay.

1

MR. HORTON:

The comment that he made to

2

you about the police officer, would that affect your

3

deliberation in any way?

4

JUROR LEMBKE:

5

THE COURT:

6

No.

Okay.

Thank you.

You can

sit back in the jury box.

7

(Whereupon, Juror Lembke

8 I left the chambers.)
g

Miss Remal, you can make your motion.

10

M S . REMAL:

Your Honor, I would move

11

for a mistrial.

I'm sure that Mrs. Lembke didn't mean

12

anything by her conversation with the witness, but I'm

13

still concerned that there was a little bit of conversation

14

pertaining to the case, at least to the jury selection,

15

that went on, and the comment about him saying that he

16

would have answered the question differently than she

17

apparently did.

18

some influence depending on that.

19

the fact that she had this conversation with him, I'm

20

afraid that even though not consciously she may just find

21

him more believable because she may think he's a nice guy,

22

having had this conversation.

23

concerned about that.

I'm just a little concerned there may be

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. HORTON:

Arid as I said before,

And I'pi a little bit

Mr. Horton?
From the limited conversation

1

they h a d and the fact she's b e e n in here and questioned

2 i about it, my impression would be if anything she would
31 try to compensate in favor of the defense.

And I don't

4 I think there's a basis for a mistrial, so w e would oppose
s

the motion at this time.

6|

j

THE COURT:

My perception of the

7

converstation's content and the response of the juror to

8

the questions about the conversation leads the Court to

I

|

9 I believe there's no basis for a mistrial.
M o t i o n is denied,

10
11

M S . REMAL:

Well - -

12

THE COURT:

I guess w e can do - -

13

M S . REMAL:• Do it?

14I

THE COURT:

15

Wait.

16

Wait.

j
|

I guess w e can go do it.

Wait.

M S . REMAL:

Y o u r Honor, I w o u l d like to

17

renew my M o t i o n to Supress the evidence that was taken as

18

a result of the search of the car on the day of Mr. Larocco r s

19

arrest and just m a k e it clear to the court there's a

20

continuing objection to the evidence obtained as a result

21

of that search, so I don't; have to jump up and down through

22

the trial.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

Motion is denied, and the

ruling of the Court y o u already have.
M S . REMAL:

Thank you.

ADDENDUM C

1

decided by this jury.

2

I appreciate your being here for the purpose

3

of this experience and on behalf of the citizens of the

4

community, we wish to thank you for your participation.

5

You've done a good job listening to the evidence it

6

appeared to me.

7

the deliberation room or make no comment on how you make

8

a determination on the verdict, but I think you were

9

attentive, and that's what counts.

I don't know anything about your job in

You have proven again

10

the system at least can be employed to make a determination

n

to find the truth.

12

And I appreciate your participation.

The jury is excused.

13

MS. REMAL:

Thank you very much.

Excuse me, Your Honor.

14

Before you excuse the jury, may Mr. Horton and I approach

15

the bench?

16
17

THE COURT:

Yes.
(Whereupon, there was a

18

discussion off the record between Court and counsel at the

19

bench, out of the hearing of the jury.)

20
21

Counsel have raised an issue, and I need to
explore it with you, ladies and gentlemen.

22

The defendant indicates that during the time

23

of the noon recess when you were leaving to go to lunch,

24

while the bailiff had you in custody, he took you down to

25

a place where the defendant was entering a police car,

1

showing that he was in custody.

2

of you saw that.

3

should have made sure that situation didn't occur.

4

what the complaint is.

5
6

And I wondered whether any

I suppose what I'm saying is the bailiff
That's

Any of you see the defendant getting into a
police car?

7

JUROR BRAGG:

I saw him, but I didn't

8

see him go get into a police car.

9

but he was with a guy with a suit on.

to

THE COUPvT:

11

JUROR BRAGG:

12

JUROR BROADHEAD:

I saw him go downstairs,

Just walking down the stairs?
Yeah.
I saw him when he

13

was approaching the car.

14

him, but we were sitting in the back of a station wagon

15

facing that way.

16
17

I probably wouldn't have seen

THE COURT:

You were sitting in the back

of the station wagon?

18

JUROR BROADHEAD:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE BAILIFF:

21

THE COURT:

22
23
24
25

Uh-huh.

Whose station wagon is that?
This lady here.
Oh.

(Indicating.

You rode over to the

China Village?
THE BAILIFF:

Yeah.

They didn't want

to freeze their toes.
JUROR BROADHEAD:

That's the only way I

1

saw him.
THE COURT:

2
3

on your determination in this cas$?

4
5

Did that have any influence

You're shaking your head, Miss Bragg.
have any effect - -

6

JUROR BRAGG: No.

7

THE COURT:

- - on your decision in the

8

case, influence your deliberations?

9

JUROR BRAGG: No.
THE COURT:

10
11

It didn't

Miss Broadhead, how about

you?

12

JUROR BROADHEAD: No.

13

THE COURT: Anyone else see him get into

14

a police car?
All right. You're excused.

15

(Whereupon, the jury was

16
17

excused at 3:54 p.m.)
THE COURT: What do you want to do about

18
19

Thank you.

sentencing?

20

MS. REMAL: Your Honor, Mr. Larocco has

21

indicated that he would prefer to be sentenced at a later

22

date.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MS. REMAL: We ask that a pre-sentence

25

report be prepared.

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION JNU.

If the State has failed to convince you beyond a
reasonable doubt of the existence of all of the elements of
the offense of Auto Theft, you may consider whether the
Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle.

Before you can find PHILLIP

LAROCCO guilty of the crime of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle,
the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about the 6th day of June, 1985, ir*

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO had in
his possession a motor vehicle that: had been stolen or unlawfully
taken,
2.

That PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO knew or had reason to

believe the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken.
3.

That the Defendant v/as not an officer of the lav;

engaged at that time in the performance of his duty as such an
officer.
If you believe that the evidence established each and
all of these essential elements of the offense beyond a resonable
doubt, it is you duty to convict the Defendant.

On the other

hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of
said elements, then you should find the Defendant Not Cuilty.

ADDENDUM E

INSTRUCTION NO.

11

When you retire to consider your verdicts, you will select
one of your members to act as foreperson who will preside over your
deliberations.
Your verdicts in this case must be either:
Guilty of THEFT as charged in Count I of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count I, THEFT;
And/Or
Guilty of POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE as charged in
Count II of the Information; or
Net Guilty of Count II, P03ESSI0N OF A STOLEN VEHICLE;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concrrence of
all jurors is required to find a verdict.

Your verdicts must be

in v/riting and when found, must be signed and dated by your foreperson and then returned by you to this court.

When your verdicts

have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to repor.
to the Court.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah

JUDGE

y% . -$f

H. DiXON hiroDLEY
f-s^
CLERK ,
By^4(, ) t M MJ.'l'l 1^
ij
Denuty Clerk

